The Premerger Notification Office (PNO) of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently formalized a new position on Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act) reporting obligations for certain not-for-profit, non-stock transactions. The change is currently in effect and applies to transactions that have not yet closed. The change in position will require reporting of many hospital transactions that have not traditionally been treated as reportable events. The biggest area of change relates to affiliation transactions where hospitals or health systems affiliate under a new parent entity.

Under its previous position, the PNO focused on whether a transaction results in a change of “control” of the board of directors of one or more of the combining entities. Under its new position, the PNO will focus on beneficial ownership–whether one party receives beneficial ownership over the assets of another party as a result of the transaction. Now, a potentially reportable acquisition can occur even when there is no change in the control of the board of directors of one of the combining entities because formal board control is not the exclusive method of obtaining beneficial ownership.

In a recently published Tip Sheet, the PNO provided analysis of reportability for three types of not-for-profit combinations that it regularly sees, which we summarize below. The first two examples involve traditional application of the rules to hospital transactions, while the third example represents the PNO’s newly formed position on affiliations. Note that in all of the examples below, we focus on the nature of the transaction structure to evaluate whether a potentially reportable acquisition of assets has occurred. In any specific transaction, the parties would also need to evaluate whether the statutory thresholds are met (e.g., the $84.4 million size-of-transaction test), as well as whether any exemption applies.

1. A simple acquisition in which an existing acquiring person (g., a not-for-profit hospital) is deemed to hold the assets of the acquired entity (e.g., another not-for-profit hospital) as a result of the acquisition. This can happen in a variety of ways, such as a straight asset acquisition or a transaction in which one not-for-profit becomes the sole corporate member of another. If one not-for-profit obtains the right to manage and operate another through a corporate transaction, that is likely a reportable structure.

a. PNO conclusion: This structure is reportable as an asset acquisition.

2. A transaction in which the existing not-for-profit entities remain independent but form a new joint venture entity as a jointly owned subsidiary or affiliate. The pre-existing entities remain separate persons for HSR Act purposes.

a.  PNO conclusion: This structure is reportable. However, the 16 C.F.R. § 802.40 exemption for the formation of a not-for-profit joint venture is likely to apply.
b. The illustration below depicts this structure:

3. A transaction in which the existing not-for-profit entities consolidate under a new not-for-profit entity. The existing entities lose their separate pre-acquisition identities or become wholly owned subsidiaries of the new entity. The exact structure of board appointment for the members of the not-for-profit entities does not drive the reportability assessment.

a. PNO conclusion: Under the PNO’s new position, the transaction is reportable as a consolidation.
b. The illustration below depicts this structure:

In the Tip Sheet, the PNO described several factors that it has considered relevant to the analysis of beneficial ownership in the context of hospitals affiliating under a new entity:

  • The new entity becomes the corporate member of the affiliating hospital entities
  • The new entity has the right to authorize and/or approve the articles, bylaws, and other governance documents of the affiliating hospital entities
  • The new entity has the right to authorize and/or approve the sale or lease of the affiliating hospital assets
  • The new entity has the right to appoint and/or approve the senior officers of the affiliating hospital entities
  • The new entity has the right to devise and/or approve the strategic plans, capital budgets and expenditures, and significant contracting of the affiliating hospitals

Overall, not-for-profit hospital systems need to plan for HSR Act filings being required for many transactions that, under prior PNO analysis, would not have required notification. While the FTC would routinely investigate hospital affiliations that did not require HSR Act filings, the FTC will have additional procedural leverage when there is a mandatory filing, which creates the statutory waiting periods and Second Request mechanisms.

WHAT HAPPENED

  • On December 1, 2016 Parker-Hannifin agreed to acquire Clarcor for $4.3 billion.
  • The merger agreement included a $200 million divestiture cap – that is, Parker-Hannifin was required, if necessary, to divest assets representing up to $200 million in net sales to obtain antitrust clearance.
  • The initial antitrust waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act) expired on January 17, 2017.
  • Parker-Hannifin completed the acquisition on February 28, 2017.
  • Nearly seven months later on September 26, 2017, the DOJ filed suit in US District Court for the District of Delaware seeking to require Parker-Hannifin to divest either its or Clarcor’s aviation fuel filtration assets.
  • The DOJ did not include in its complaint an allegation or statement that the parties increased prices.
  • The DOJ press release indicates that the parties “failed to provide significant document or data productions in response to the department’s requests.” We believe that this refers to the DOJ’s post-closing investigation.
  • The DOJ did not suggest in its complaint or the press release that the parties failed to provide required documentation under the HSR Act (e.g., Item 4 documents). During the initial 30-day HSR waiting period, the parties are under no obligation to submit documentation or data to DOJ or FTC requests – all responses are voluntary.

WHAT THIS MEANS

  • Challenges to transactions after the HSR waiting period expired are rare and typically involve a situation where the parties failed to supply required documentation under the HSR Act.
  • Challenges post-HSR clearance are even rarer when the parties complied with their obligations under the HSR Act and supplied all required documentation (e.g., Item 4 documents).
  • The DOJ’s post-HSR clearance action demonstrates that the DOJ may still challenge a transaction post-closing if it later discovers a niche problematic overlap that it did not discover during the initial HSR waiting period.
  • While this challenge may be an aberration, it raises additional considerations when drafting risk allocation provisions in merger agreements for HSR reportable transactions because merger agreements do not typically account for a post-HSR clearance challenge from the DOJ or FTC.
  • DOJ action in this matter suggests the Trump administration is unlikely to be lax in its merger enforcement and will continue to analyze competition in narrow markets.

On August 31, 2017, the Attorney General of Washington filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington alleging that two transactions harmed competition for healthcare on the Kitsap Peninsula.

WHAT HAPPENED:

  • In July 2016, CHI Franciscan Health System (Franciscan) acquired WestSound Orthopedics (WestSound), a physician practice of seven orthopedists based in Silverdale, Washington.
  • In September 2016, Franciscan entered into a set of agreements which allowed The Doctors Clinic (TDC), a 54 physician multispecialty practice also based in Silverdale, to use Franciscan’s reimbursement rates with payors in exchange for certain ancillary services.
  • While the publicly stated rationale for the transactions included “enhanced patient access and efficiency,” the Attorney General’s complaint alleged that the “true motivation” for the deals was to “charge higher rates for physician services, and to collectively gain negotiating clout over healthcare payers by removing head-to-head competition.”
  • The complaint also alleges that the TDC agreements would enable Franciscan to effectively shut down TDC’s facilities providing ancillary surgical, imaging, and laboratory services, and shift these outpatient procedures to Franciscan’s nearby inpatient hospital, where it could charge higher, hospital-based rates for the same services.

WHAT THIS MEANS:

  • Even without involvement from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), state attorneys general can and do independently challenge transactions they consider anticompetitive and continue to be aggressive in pursuing enforcement actions where health systems either acquire physician practices or use other agreements to charge higher rates for physician and ancillary services
  • Health systems should consider that even unreportable transactions may trigger a challenge from either the FTC or state attorneys general to unwind them and, if a transaction has been consummated, any profits resulting from an unlawful transaction may be subject to disgorgement.
  • Since internal emails and documents discussing a transaction, even one that does not meet the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act’s reporting threshold, may eventually surface in an antitrust investigation, this illustrates how “bad documents” can undermine obtaining clearance for a transaction.

A private lawsuit filed by Retrophin Inc. (Retrophin), under then-CEO Martin Shkreli, likely triggered an investigation by the FTC into a consummated transaction.  Both the private lawsuit and the FTC complaint resulted in settlement.  In addition, the FTC levied a $100 million penalty.

WHAT HAPPENED:

  • In 2013, Questcor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Questcor) acquired the U.S. rights to Synacthen Depot (Synacthen) from Novartis (Mallinckrodt later acquired Questcor).
  • Questcor’s $135 million deal with Novartis out-bid several companies seeking to acquire Synacthen, including biopharmaceutical company Retrophin, who bid $16 million for the Synacthen license.
  • In 2014, Retrophin (under then-CEO Martin Shkreli) filed suit against Questcor, alleging that the purpose of the transaction between Questcor and Novartis was to eliminate competition for Achthar, Novartis’ ACTH drug used to treat infantile spasms and nephrotic syndrome, by shutting down Synacthen.
  • Retrophin’s case was settled in 2015 with Mallinckrodt (who acquired Questcor in the interim) paying Retrophin $15.5 million.
  • There are reports that the FTC challenged the consummated transaction of Questcor/Novartis following Retophin’s lawsuit. The FTC’s challenge recently resulted in a $100 million monetary payment and licensing of Synacthen for treatment of infantile spasms and nephrotic syndrome to an FTC approved licensee.

WHAT THIS MEANS:

  • Even if a transaction is non-reportable under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, the FTC or DOJ may open an investigation into the transaction. The Questcor/Novartis transaction was not reported under the then-existing HSR rules because Novartis, the licensor, retained some manufacturing rights to Synacthen.
  • The FTC and DOJ may learn about potentially anticompetitive transactions in numerous ways, including HSR filings, news reports, complaints from disgruntled customers or competitors, private litigation involving the transaction, and as shown here, from the losing bidder.
  • HSR clearance or a determination that a transaction is not HSR reportable does not mean that the transaction is free and clear of government antitrust investigations or private litigation.

In May, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) required Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC to divest its 23 percent interest in Unimark Remedies, Ltd. and its US marketing rights to a generic drug under manufacture by Unimark as a condition to allowing Hikma to complete its acquisition of Roxane Laboratories. The FTC was concerned that Hikma’s continued holding of a 23 percent interest in Unimark after consummation of its proposed acquisition of Roxane would create the incentive and ability for Hikma to eliminate future competition between Roxane and Hikma/Unimark in the sale of generic flecainide tablets (a drug used to treat abnormally fast heart rhythms) in the United States.

The FTC’s divestiture requirement was unusual but not unprecedented. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines identify three theories of competitive harm associated with an acquisition or holding of a small but significant minority interest in a competitor.

  1. Minority ownership, and any associated rights, such as veto rights over the competing firm’s budget or strategic decisions, or representation on its board of directors, may allow the shareholder to forestall, delay or otherwise hamper the competing firm’s further development or marketing of competitive products
  2. The holder of a minority interest in a competing firm has diminished incentives to compete aggressively with the competitor firm because the holder obtains an economic benefit from the success of the competing firm through its partial ownership of that competitor.
  3. The holder of a minority interest in a competing firm may have access to non-public, competitively sensitive information of the competing firm, and thus may be better able to coordinate its business decisions—such as pricing, output, or research and development efforts—with those of the competing firm, thus diminishing competition.

These theories of potential antitrust harm from minority interest acquisitions are not unique to the United States; other competition agencies, including the European Union’s competition directorate, accept and apply these theories when considering the competitive impact of a firm’s actual or proposed partial ownership interest in a competitor. However, the United States applies a significantly lower threshold than the European Union (and other competition agencies) for the pre-acquisition notification of an entity’s acquisition of a minority, non-controlling interest in another firm.

Read the full article here.

On May 30, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in a dispute with the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) regarding the Commission’s authority to require the pharmaceutical industry to report certain transfers of exclusive patent rights under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act.

The dispute centered on a Final Rule promulgated by the FTC in November 2013.  Patents are considered assets by the FTC and their transfer may be reportable.  Some transactions provide for the transfer of certain exclusive patent rights without implicating the transfer of the patent in its entirety.  The FTC maintains that the exclusive right to commercially use all or part of a patent is, in substance, identical to a full acquisition of the patent.  The challenged rule was intended to clarify the circumstances when a transfer of exclusive rights to a pharmaceutical patent is considered a potentially reportable acquisition of an asset under the HSR Act.

PhRMA sued to have the new rule set aside.  PhRMA contended in its complaint that the FTC lacked the statutory authority to issue rules that target a single industry, as opposed to rules of general effect.  The trade organization also contended that the FTC failed to establish a rational basis for an industry-specific rule and that it failed to comply with legally required procedures in instituting the rule. PhRMA and the FTC both filed motions for summary judgment.

In granting summary judgment to the FTC, Judge Beryl Howell agreed that Congress had never spoken in the HSR Act to the specific issue of whether the FTC was authorized to issue industry-specific rules: “Nothing in this text restricts the FTC to generating only general rules rather than industry specific rules.”  Given the congressional silence on this specific question, the court next considered whether the FTC’s interpretation of the statue was a permissible one.  Under the applicable legal standard, an agency’s rule is entitled to deference “as long as it is a permissible construction of the statute.”  The FTC contended that the Final Rule did not expand “‘HSR requirements to parties or transactions not covered by the Act,’  but ‘simply clarif[ied] the types of transactions that constitute asset transfers for which the Act requires prior notification.’”  The court concluded this was a permissible construction of the authority granted to the FTC under the HSR Act.

by Lincoln Mayer

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has approved social media heavyweight Twitter’s $350 million stock acquisition of MoPub.  Twitter’s purchase of the mobile advertising exchange, which helps companies place ads on mobile devices, is expected to enhance Twitter’s ability to tailor mobile ads to users.  The size of the deal triggered the Hart-Scott Rodino (HSR) Act’s mandatory filing requirement, but the FTC concluded that the acquisition posed no anticompetitive obstacles.

This high-profile transaction is a reminder of the value of good planning and involving antitrust counsel early in the planning process, even where the parties do not anticipate significant antitrust issues.  With enough advance warning, counsel can work with the antitrust agencies to showcase the procompetitive aspects of the transaction, mitigate any problematic aspects and seek rapid clearance of deals that, at least from a competitive standpoint, are relatively straightforward.  In Twitter’s case, that meant being able to resolve a potential regulatory issue involving its largest acquisition to date before the launch of Twitter’s initial public offering.

by Joseph Winterscheid

In December 2011, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that a public company chief executive officer (CEO) will pay a $500,000 civil penalty to settle charges that he violated Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (H-S-R Act) premerger reporting and waiting period requirements.  The DOJ, acting at the request of the Federal Trade Commission, charged the executive for failing to satisfy the H-S-R Act’s requirements before acquiring common stock under the company’s stock-based compensation program.  The CEO allegedly exceeded the H-S-R Act filing threshold ($59.8 million when the alleged violation occurred) upon the vesting of outstanding restricted stock units awards and the reinvestment of dividends and short term interest through his 401(k) account.

Violations of the H-S-R Act’s reporting and waiting period requirements are subject to fines of up to $16,000 per day.  The DOJ’s recent enforcement action illustrates the potentially costly consequences of a failure to consider H-S-R Act compliance in connection with investment planning for corporate executives (and other individuals) who will hold or acquire stock valued in excess of the H-S-R Act’s notification threshold (currently $66 million and moving to $68.2 million effective February 27, 2012), and that violations may occur under somewhat obscure circumstances.  In this connection, it is also important to remember that the relevant valuation is determined by reference to the total value of the voting securities that will held following any given acquisition of shares.  Thus, for example, if an executive already holds shares valued at $65,999,999, a reporting obligation could be triggered by acquiring just one additional share.  Likewise, if the executive’s existing holding has already crossed the $66 million valuation threshold through appreciation, any further acquisitions could trigger a reporting obligation.