The second quarter of 2019 proved to be a busy season for antitrust matters. In the United States, agencies continued to be aggressive and blocked transactions or required significant remedies. They cleared three mergers where divestitures were required; and in the face of FTC or DOJ opposition, companies abandoned several transactions, including between Republic National

The first quarter of 2019 proved to be as active as ever for antitrust regulators in both the United States and Europe. In the United States, vertical merger enforcement was the focus of a few high-profile matters. The US DOJ has been working on an update to the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, possibly providing clarification for

by Henry Chen, Frank Schoneveld and Alex An

China’s Ministry of Commerce recently issued two new draft regulations.  The first provides a wider range of potential remedies to obtain the clearance of a concentration (e.g., a merger, acquisition, joint venture, etc.); the other defines the standards for “simple” merger cases that are

by Philip Bentley QC and Philipp Werner

The European General Court (GC) has confirmed a European Commission decision to hold chemical companies EI du Pont de Nemours and Dow Chemical jointly and severally liable for a fine imposed on their 50:50 joint venture (JV) for an infringement of European competition law (EI du Pont

by Frank Schoneveld, Brian Fu and James Jiang

In giving approval to GE China’s joint venture with Shenhua Coal, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has answered positively the recurring question of whether the formation of a joint venture falls within China’s merger control rules.  It is now clear that the formation of a joint

by Veronica Pinotti, Riccardo Franceschi and Martino Sforza

Compliance with EU and national antitrust merger control rules can significantly impact the feasibility, timing and costs of M&A transactions.  Parties to a proposed transaction in the EU should assess the merger control issues early in the process and evaluate and comply with any procedural antitrust