THE LATEST: Behavioral Remedy Satisfies European Commission in Rolls-Royce’s €720M Agreement to Purchase the Rest of ITP

WHAT HAPPENED:

  • Rolls-Royce and SENER have a 47 percent/53 percent joint-venture in Industrial de Turbo Propulsores (ITP)–an aircraft engine components manufacturer.
  • Rolls-Royce, together with ITP, MTU and Safran, are members of a military engine consortium–Europrop International (EPI)–that supplies the engine to the Airbus’ A400M, the primary competitor to the Lockheed Martin C-130J.
  • The European Commission (EC) had concerns that Rolls-Royce’s full ownership of ITP would increase its influence in EPI such that Rolls-Royce could undercut the competitiveness of the EPI engine, and consequently subvert Airbus’ competitiveness vis-à-vis Lockheed Martin.
  • The EC and Rolls-Royce agreed to a behavioral remedy focused on EPI’s governance rules that would eliminate the potential conflict of interest and maintain EPI’s competitiveness. While the EC press release does not provide details, the agreement likely allows MTU and Safran to control the consortium’s decision making.

WHAT THIS MEANS:

  • Antitrust enforcers continue to investigate competitive impacts from vertical transactions.
  • While antitrust enforcers have a strong preference for structural remedies, when addressing vertical competition issues, there is greater potential that enforcers will accept a behavioral fix.
  • Antitrust enforcers continue to focus on antitrust impacts in narrow markets. Here, the remedy is designed to maintain competition between the Airbus A400M and Lockheed Martin’s C-130J – military turboprop transport aircraft.

McDermott Releases 1Q2017 Antitrust M&A Snapshot

McDermott’s Antitrust M&A Snapshot is a resource for in-house counsel and others who deal with antitrust M&A issues but are not faced with these issues on a daily basis. In each quarterly issue, we will provide concise summaries of Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Justice (DOJ) and European Commission (EC) news and events related to M&A, including significant ongoing investigations, trials and consent orders, as well as analysis on the trends we see developing in the antitrust review process.

Read McDermott’s 1Q2017 M&A Snapshot.

THE LATEST: Limiting Early Discovery in Parallel Criminal and Civil Cases

Companies are increasingly facing parallel proceedings involving government investigations and follow-on private litigation. These complex cases often involve competing interests between the parties that can influence a judge’s determination on discovery timing and process.

  • Private plaintiffs are incentivized to obtain as much information about the case as early as possible to support their allegations and avoid having the case dismissed on summary judgment.
  • Defendants hope to delay, or save altogether, the expenditure of potentially millions in discovery costs.
  • The government has a strong interest in preserving the confidentiality and integrity of their investigation without interference from civil plaintiffs. Continue Reading

Overview of the Proposed Reforms of the EU Merger Control Regime

In the past couple of years, the European Commission has decided to review and evaluate the functioning of different aspects of the EU merger control regime regulated by EU Regulation No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EU Merger Regulation), its implementing regulation and related notices and guidelines.

The process started in 2014 when the Commission adopted a White Paper titled “Towards More Effective EU Merger Control” (the White Paper), which presented the Commission’s view that EU merger control worked well and that no fundamental overhaul of the system was needed. The Commission did, however, identify specific amendments to the EU Merger Regulation to make it more effective.

In the wake of the positive feedback it received during the consultation it organised following the publication of the White Paper, the Commission launched another public consultation in October 2016 on the “Evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control”, through which it is seeking feedback from stakeholders on the effectiveness of certain additional procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control. Stakeholders have until 13 January 2017 to respond.

Continue Reading

THE LATEST: Entanglements and Concentrated Markets Require Divestiture in the Dairy Industry

On July 6, 2016, Danone S.A. (Danone) agreed to acquire The WhiteWave Foods Company (WhiteWave) for $12.5 billion.

WhiteWave is the leading manufacturer of fluid organic milk in the United States and one of the top purchasers of raw organic milk. Danone is the leading US manufacturer of organic yogurt (Stonyfield). Nearly 90 percent of the raw organic milk used by Danone to manufacture organic yogurt is supplied via a strategic agreement by CROPP Cooperative (CROPP). As of 2009, the strategic supply agreement between Danone and CROPP also includes Danone providing CROPP with an exclusive license for the production and sale of Stonyfield branded fluid organic milk.

WhiteWave and CROPP are the two largest purchasers and top competitors for purchasing raw organic milk from farmers in the Northeast US. Additionally, WhiteWave, CROPP and Danone-CROPP are the only nationwide competitors for the sale of fluid organic milk to retailers and have a 91 percent share of nationwide branded fluid organic milk: Horizon (WhiteWave), Organic Valley (CROPP) and Stonyfield (Danone-CROPP). Continue Reading

Bag Fee Case Highlights Antitrust Risk Of Public Statements

For publicly traded companies, earnings calls are routine business events, as are press releases, speeches, investor conferences and trade association meetings. However, in the world of antitrust law, words uttered in these situations can provide fodder for plaintiffs to claim that instead of providing information for investors and the public, the communication’s purpose was to invite competitors to unlawfully collude. In the past several years, allegations that competitors used public statements to carry out a price-fixing agreement have been a common thread in antitrust class actions and multidistrict litigations.

Recently, a federal district court granted summary judgment in an antitrust case based on earnings calls in the airline industry. While the defendants ultimately prevailed, the case stands as a reminder to publicly traded companies to be mindful of antitrust considerations in earnings calls and other public communications.

Read the full article.

Originally published in Law360.com, April 11, 2017.

Implementation of the European Union Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions into French Law

On 10 March 2017, France finally implemented into French law the EU Directive 2014/104 of 26 November 2014 on antitrust damages actions. The implementation provisions faithfully transpose the Directive, but some concepts still, however, need to be clarified by courts at the EU and French levels.

Read the full article.

THE LATEST: Acting AAG Clarifies Scope of Amnesty for Executives

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division (the Division) offers leniency to the first company to contact the Division and acknowledge participation in an antitrust conspiracy such as price-fixing, bid-rigging or market allocation. The Division’s leniency program requires the applicant to fully cooperate with the government’s investigation and to candidly acknowledge its wrongdoing, among other requirements. In return, the successful applicant receives a pass from corporate criminal exposure and also receives immunity for its officers, directors and executives.

The leniency program is the crown jewel of the Division’s enforcement regime because of its demonstrated success generating new cases. The program’s ability to attract applicants is based on its transparency and predictability. The level of trust required for companies to air their criminal wrongdoing to prosecuting authorities is not automatic. It has been earned over the years by a program that keeps its promises and works as designed. Therefore, changes to the program are closely watched by the defense bar for any perceived lessening of immunity coverage. Continue Reading

European Commission Launches New Cartel Reporting Tool, Member States Laud the Role of Whistleblowers

European Commissioner of Competition Margrethe Vestager made news when she announced that the European Commission had launched a new IT system enabling individuals to anonymously report cartel activity. In parallel, several EU Member States have–in recent weeks–highlighted the role of individual informants in their own enforcement efforts. Taken together, these developments show that the stakes of effective and meaningful antitrust compliance continue to rise, as individuals have more avenues to report anticompetitive conduct.

Speaking in Berlin on March 16, 2017, Commissioner Vestager stated, “We’ve discovered a lot of cartels thanks to leniency programs […] But we don’t just rely on leniency. We pay attention to other methods as well. And that includes encouraging individuals to come forward, when their conscience is troubled by the information that they have about a cartel. That’s why we recently launched a new IT system to help people tell us anonymously about cartels. The system means that we can communicate both ways with them without risking their anonymity while we gather information.”

Commissioner Vestager noted that the European Commission’s new system is modelled on a system implemented by the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) in 2012. Notably, the FCO itself published a brochure in late February 2017 titled “Effective Cartel Enforcement” highlighting, among other things, the success of its whistleblowing program. The FCO noted that its system is accessible from its website and “guarantees the anonymity of informers while still allowing for continual reciprocal communication with the investigative staff [at the FCO] via a secure electronic mailbox.” Between June 2012 and December 2016, the FCO reports receiving 1,420 tips, “some of which” have led to proceedings resulting in fines.

Continue Reading

THE LATEST: Antitrust Umps Throw Out Information Exchanges Relating To LA Dodgers Broadcast Rights

The Department of Justice (DOJ) reinforces the perils of competitor information exchanges by challenging alleged communications between DirecTV and other video programmers related to broadcast rights for Los Angeles (LA) Dodgers baseball.

WHAT HAPPENED:

  • In November 2016, the DOJ filed an antitrust complaint against DirecTV. DOJ alleged:
    • The LA Dodgers sought to sell broadcast rights to their baseball games to cable and satellite TV companies.
    • DirecTV was a potential bidder for Dodgers’ rights, as were other cable companies operating in the LA area.
    • DirectTV entered into agreements with competing cable companies to exchange information relating to their negotiations with the LA Dodgers.
    • As a result of the information learned through these information exchanges, the various potential bidders did not compete aggressively for Dodgers broadcast rights because they gained information about their rivals’ negotiating positions.
    • The negotiations dragged on, and since no programmer had broadcast rights, people in LA could not watch Dodgers games on television.
    • Notably, DOJ did not allege that the broadcasters reached any price fixing or market allocation agreement.
  • In late March, DirecTV settled with the DOJ and entered into a consent order that precludes it from providing non-public, competitively sensitive information to a competitor or seeking such information from competitors.
    • There are exceptions to allow exchanges in connection with legitimate due diligence, collaborative ventures or commercial vendor/vendee arrangements.

WHAT THIS MEANS:

  • While not surprising, this case reinforces that information exchanges between competitors creates substantial antitrust risk.
  • Exchanges can create antitrust exposure even if there is no agreement between the competitors on pricing or other competitive decisions, and compliance programs should reinforce this principle.
  • Agreements or coordination among buyers raise the same types of competitive issues as agreements among sellers.
    • In this case, the Dodgers were the sellers and DirecTV and programmers were the buyers.
    • Another recent example is the FTC/DOJ guidance issued last fall on anticompetitive agreements among employers, such as “no poach” or “no solicit” agreements, which DOJ stated it may prosecute criminally if they are “naked” agreements, unrelated to a legitimate activity such as a joint venture.
  • The antitrust laws protect the competitive process rather than low prices.
    • A competitive market for the sale of products often leads to lower priced goods and services.
    • In this case, DOJ alleged that DirecTV and the other providers exchanged information to prevent the Dodgers from raising the price for Dodgers’ broadcasts, but that did not legitimize the conduct.
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