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FTC Developments

Office Supplies Surprise: FTC Approves Office Depot-OfficeMax Merger

by Emily Townsend | Nov 7, 2013 | FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

On Friday, November 1, 2013 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ended a seven-month investigation of the proposed merger between Office Depot Inc. and OfficeMax Inc., allowing the transaction to move forward.

The merger between the second and third largest office supply superstores (OSS) is not the first time the FTC has been interested in OSS transactions. In 1997, the FTC successfully blocked a proposed merger between the two largest OSS in FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). The FTC’s seemingly contradictory positions can be discerned, however, by the changes in the competitive landscape for OSS.

As acknowledged in the FTC’s statement concerning the proposed merger, OSS now compete with online retailers and mass merchants far more than in 1997. In fact, in Staples, the court determined that while mass merchants, wholesale clubs and mail order firms sold office supplies, prices at OSS were primarily affected by the presence of another OSS in the geographic market. Because of this determination, the FTC was successful in arguing that the relevant product market was the sale of consumable office supplies just through OSS.

Now, OSS compete rigorously with the growing number and size of online retailers and mass merchants. As the FTC found, OSS “closely monitor” and “respond competitively” to non-OSS retailers. Indeed, the FTC noted that OSS are responding to such competition not only through staples of competition such as price matching and price-checking, but also through innovation, such as “offering in-store pickup for online purchases and using in-store internet kiosks to order products online.”

The rapidly changing landscape in the consumable office supplies market is highlighted by two contrasting outcomes sixteen years apart. It highlights the importance of staying abreast of how changes in market dynamics and modernizing competition law may affect regulators’ view of potential transactions. As exemplified in this case, such knowledge can lead to a successful evaluation of a transaction that was previously thought to be impossible.

Republicans Press FTC to Establish a Clear Standard for Section 5

by Young Cynn | Oct 29, 2013 | FTC Developments

In a letter to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on Wednesday, October 23, eight GOP lawmakers from both the House and the Senate called on the FTC to publish clear guidance on Section 5 of the FTC Act.

Section 5 grants the Commission broad authority to regulate “unfair methods of competition” beyond the scope of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), the Supreme Court opined that the FTC was authorized to consider public values beyond the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws when enforcing Section 5. Then, during the 1980s, courts began rejecting the FTC’s attempts to bring Section 5 actions, out of concern that the agency had failed to put forth adequate standards. More recently, the FTC has used Section 5 in various agency actions to target invitations to collude and breaches of standard-setting commitments, but no cases have been affirmed by the courts.

In their letter, the legislators warned that “the absence of clear parameters . . . based on empirical and economic justifications, engenders uncertainty in the business community,” which in turn deters innovation and stifles economic growth. Over the summer, Commissioner Brill questioned the need for a formal statement, citing the fact that no business executive had ever addressed the lack of guidance with her. The letter also contended that defendants in administrative cases often settle due to “economic pressures rather than substantive agreement,” and these settlements leave no room for judicial review – pushing back on Chairwoman Ramirez’s belief that a policy could be developed through agency enforcement actions.

Both Commissioners Wright and Ohlhausen announced policy proposals earlier this year, which the lawmakers pointed to as evidence to refute Chairwoman Ramirez’s statement from a congressional oversight hearing that it is difficult to articulate the outer bounds of Section 5 authority and that the existing informal guidance is sufficient.

Tweet: No Antitrust Problems Here

by Emily Townsend | Oct 7, 2013 | FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

by Lincoln Mayer

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has approved social media heavyweight Twitter’s $350 million stock acquisition of MoPub. Twitter’s purchase of the mobile advertising exchange, which helps companies place ads on mobile devices, is expected to enhance Twitter’s ability to tailor mobile ads to users. The size of the deal triggered the Hart-Scott Rodino (HSR) Act’s mandatory filing requirement, but the FTC concluded that the acquisition posed no anticompetitive obstacles.

This high-profile transaction is a reminder of the value of good planning and involving antitrust counsel early in the planning process, even where the parties do not anticipate significant antitrust issues. With enough advance warning, counsel can work with the antitrust agencies to showcase the procompetitive aspects of the transaction, mitigate any problematic aspects and seek rapid clearance of deals that, at least from a competitive standpoint, are relatively straightforward. In Twitter’s case, that meant being able to resolve a potential regulatory issue involving its largest acquisition to date before the launch of Twitter’s initial public offering.

FTC Initiates Inquiry Into Patent Assertion Entities

by Emily Townsend | Oct 4, 2013 | DOJ Developments, FTC Developments, IP Antitrust

by William Diaz

Last week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced its decision to seek public comment on a proposal to gather information from approximately 25 patent assertion entities (PAE). The agency defines a PAE as a company whose business model focuses primarily on purchasing patents and then attempting to generate revenue by asserting the intellectual property against persons who are already practicing the patented technologies. The FTC also anticipates seeking information from approximately 15 other entities asserting patents in the wireless communications sector, including manufacturers and other non-practicing entities or licensing organizations. None of the PAEs or other firms has been identified by the FTC.

In late 2012, the FTC and Department of Justice conducted an industry workshop on the impact of PAEs on innovation and competition. Workshop participants identified numerous potential harms, but noted the lack of empirical data on PAE activities. The FTC now proposes to collect such data pursuant to its information-gathering authority under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act. The full scope of the information the FTC will seek is described in the official notice, which is can be found here. Public comments will be accepted for 60 days following publication in the Federal Register.

FTC and DOJ Accepting HSR Filings During Shutdown

by Emily Townsend | Oct 1, 2013 | DOJ Developments, FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

by Gregory Heltzer

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) both announced that they will have limited staff on hand to accept Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification filings during the U.S. federal government shutdown. The HSR Act requires that parties subject to the Act must wait 30 days before closing their transaction. This waiting period provides the agencies with time to determine whether to challenge a transaction prior to closing. During the shutdown, the FTC will continue HSR investigations to the extent that “a failure by the government to challenge the transaction before it is consummated will result in a substantial impairment of the government’s ability to secure effective relief at a later time.” (See, FTC Shutdown Plan.) Likewise, the DOJ will also prepare cases that must be filed due to expiration of the HSR waiting period. (See, DOJ Shutdown Plan.) We will provide updates if and when we learn more regarding the protocols for merger review during the shutdown.

FTC Reaches Unique Settlement with Phoebe Putney Health System Resolving Lengthy Hospital Merger Challenge

by Emily Townsend | Aug 28, 2013 | FTC Developments, Healthcare Antitrust, IP Antitrust, Mergers & Acquisitions

by Carrie G. Amezcua and Stephen Wu

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Phoebe Putney Health System settled the FTC’s complaint that the health system’s merger with Palmyra Park Hospital violated the antitrust laws. Unique state statutes and regulations effectively prevented the FTC from obtaining its usual remedy for unlawful mergers or acquisitions, a divestiture. Instead, the FTC is requiring Phoebe Putney to provide prior notice of certain future acquisitions and prohibiting it from objecting to state applications by competitors to enter or expand in the marketplace.

To read the full article, click here.

FTC Takes a Broad, “Generic” Approach to Actavis in Amicus Brief

by Emily Townsend | Aug 22, 2013 | FTC Developments, Healthcare Antitrust, IP Antitrust

by Daniel Powers

The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) battle against “reverse-payment” settlements continues. In an amicus brief recently submitted in the case of In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation, the FTC advanced a broad interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis that looks beyond the labels applied to agreements between brand pharmaceutical manufacturers and the specific type of consideration provided to induce delayed generic entry. The FTC also outlines a two-step inquiry it contends is the appropriate manner of analyzing the potential antitrust concerns raised by such agreements.

The FTC has long targeted “reverse payment” settlements. A reverse payment settlement restricts the generic pharmaceutical from entering the market until a future date (even if that date is before the patent at issue expires) and includes a transfer of value from the brand to the generic firm, typically in the form of payments arising from an ancillary agreement for services or products provided by the generic. The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis, while rejecting the FTC’s view that “reverse payment” agreements were per se illegal, nevertheless held that such agreements were not immune from antitrust scrutiny. The Court held that such agreements “can sometimes violate the antitrust laws,” and that the rule of reason is the legal standard that courts must apply when determining whether such a particular agreement violates the antitrust laws.

In the Effexor XR case, plaintiffs have challenged a patent settlement agreement between pharmaceutical manufacturers Wyeth and Teva Pharmaceuticals. They claim that Teva agreed to delay introduction of its generic version of Wyeth’s drug Effexor XR, and that Wyeth agreed not to market an authorized generic version of Effexor XR for a period of time. There was no cash payment between the defendants and for this reason they have argued that Actavis is not applicable.

The FTC’s brief rejects the view that Actavis is limited to cash payments only. It contends that the defendants’ interpretation puts form over substance and would allow a ready means for manufacturers to circumvent the Actavis ruling. The FTC argues that Actavis instead reflects an approach focused on a two-part inquiry. Courts, the FTC says, must first examine whether the alleged payment (whatever form it takes) was something that the generic challenger could have obtained had it won the underlying patent infringement litigation. If not, then the courts must inquire whether the payment is a vehicle for the parties to share monopoly profits by avoiding competition.

Taking this “generic” approach to Actavis, the FTC contends that the absence of a cash payment is not determinative and that Wyeth’s commitment not to market an authorized generic version of Effexor XR “presents the same antitrust concern as the reverse payments the Supreme Court considered in Actavis.” It remains to be seen how the district court will rule, but the FTC’s amicus brief signals that the Commission will continue to scrutinize settlement agreements and will resist attempts to limit the application of Actavis narrowly to its facts.

FTC Testifies Before Congress on Impact of Patent Hold-up on Competition and Standard-Essential Patents

by Emily Townsend | Jul 31, 2013 | FTC Developments, IP Antitrust

by Karne Newburn

On July 30, 2013, Suzanne Munck, Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, on the impact of patent hold-up on competition, and standard-essential patents (SEPs). The hearing covered standard-essential patent disputes and antitrust law.

Ms. Munck’s testimony focused on SEPs that a patent holder has committed to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. The hold-up, in this context, is the potential that a SEP holder violates its RAND commitment, and then uses the leverage acquired from the standard setting process to negotiate higher royalties or other favorable terms after the standard’s adoption than it could have beforehand. She explained that patent hold-up is harmful because it can deter innovation, discourage the adoption of standards, reduce the value of standard setting and pass on excess costs to consumers.

To mitigate the threat of patent hold-up she testified that the FTC has “advocated for remedies in district courts and at the International Trade Commission (ITC),” submitted statements to the Federal Circuit and the ITC expressing its concerns, and pursued enforcement actions related to standard setting activity. Specifically related to enforcement, she commented on the FTC’s ability to use its Section 5 authority when someone claims infringement for intellectual property that is unenforceable or expired, or when someone threatens to sue without any intent to sue.

Ms. Munck concluded with the following remarks: “[T]he Commission believes that competition and intellectual property laws work together to promote innovation. Voluntary consensus-based standard setting facilitates this purpose; however, including patented technology in a standard creates the potential for patent-hold up. The Commission will continue to advocate before the federal courts and the ITC for policies that mitigate the potential for patent hold-up, and will bring enforcement actions where appropriate.”

North Carolina Dentists Seek Rehearing En Banc After Losing Bid for Antitrust Immunity

by Emily Townsend | Jul 19, 2013 | FTC Developments, Healthcare Antitrust

by Lincoln Mayer

North Carolina’s dentists were not smiling when a three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sided with the Federal Trade Commission in a challenge to the State Board of Dental Examiners’ policy that only dentists could perform teeth whitening. On July 15, 2013, the board filed a petition asking the full court to reconsider the panel’s May 31, 2013 decision. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, No. 12-1172.

The dispute centers on whether the state action doctrine shields the board’s policy from antitrust scrutiny. That doctrine holds that state actors need only show that the state had a clearly articulated policy to displace competition with regulation. However, private parties invoking the doctrine must also show that they are actively supervised by the state. The Fourth Circuit panel concluded that since the board is composed of licensed dentists who have a financial interest in the market and are answerable to other members of the profession with a similar interest, the board needed to demonstrate active state supervision. The board countered that it is a state agency and therefore does not need to satisfy this additional requirement.

The North Carolina State Bar, and the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy together with the North Carolina Board of Pharmacy and North Carolina Board of Physical Therapy Examiners, submitted amici briefs supporting the dental board’s petition.

Barry Diller to Pay $480,000 Fine for Failure to File HSR

by Emily Townsend | Jul 2, 2013 | FTC Developments

by Carla A. R. Hine

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a settlement today with Barry Diller for failing to file a Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) notification in connection with his acquisition of shares of Coca-Cola over the course of 2010-2012. Diller will pay $480,000 in civil penalties.

Diller acquired Coca-Cola voting securities, and as a result of those acquisitions, held Coca-Cola shares valued in excess of the HSR thresholds, but did not file or observe the HSR waiting period. Diller made corrective filings over a year ago, which alerted the FTC to HSR Act violations. Diller had previously made a corrective filing in a separate transaction, and the FTC did not impose a penalty at that time but did note that “Mr. Diller is accountable for instituting an effective program to ensure full compliance with the [HSR] Act’s requirements.” Here, Diller only made the corrective filings after in-house counsel for Coca-Cola inquired as to whether an HSR filing was required for his most recent acquisition.

The FTC noted specifically that Diller’s acquisition did not fall within the “investment only” exemption – which generally exempts acquisitions of voting securities where the acquirer will hold less than 10 percent of the voting securities of the issuer and will remain a passive investor – because Diller intended to “participate in the formulation, determination, or direction of the basic business decisions of Coke” as a Coca-Cola board member.

This announcement follows the FTC’s June 20 announcement that MacAndrews & Forbes agreed to pay $720,000 in connection with its failure to file HSR. Like Diller’s situation, MacAndrews & Forbes also had a prior violation of the HSR Act in connection with a separate transaction. While not an official enforcement policy, the FTC appears to give first-time offenders one free pass, but will impose civil penalties where subsequent violations occur.

Institutional investors, executives and directors should take note of this case. Some institutional investors may be able to take advantage of the “investment only” exemption where their holdings remain below 10 percent and they do not take an active role in the business decisions of the company. However, the “investment only” exemption does not apply to executives or directors (like Diller) who may acquire shares on the open market or in connection with compensation packages.

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