antitrust enforcers
Subscribe to antitrust enforcers's Posts

DOJ to Merging Parties: The Time of “Underenforcement” is Over; Fix-It-First or Risk Being Challenged

WHAT HAPPENED

During a conference last week, Ryan Danks, Director of Civil Enforcement at the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ), suggested that merging parties—not the antitrust enforcement agencies—should devise fixes for allegedly anticompetitive transactions.

Danks stated “that something is broken about the way that the antitrust community talks about remedies in the context of mergers, where parties will bring in a three-to-two or four-to-three or even a two-to-one [transactions] and say ‘now we want you, government, to work with us to figure out how to fix this’ . . . that’s not our job. Our job is to maintain competition.”

Danks added that merging parties bear the responsibility for remedying their anticompetitive transactions and have more information on the businesses, allowing them to formulate strong solutions. Such “fix-it-first” approaches may allow merging parties to complete their transactions quicker, avoiding lengthy merger reviews and consent decree negotiations.

Danks also suggested that “the simplest remedy . . . is to just stop an anticompetitive transaction from occurring,” strongly hinting that today’s DOJ would rather challenge an entire transaction than work with the parties on devising a remedy to address specific competitive concerns in limited product or geographic markets.

Jonathan Kanter, Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, conveyed similar views in two speeches last week, making it clear that merger enforcement at the DOJ will become even more vigorous.

On September 13, 2022, Kanter:

  • Warned that “[c]ompanies considering mergers that may harm competition should know that the Antitrust Division will not back down from a fight so long as that threat remains.”
  • Emphasized that the Clayton Act’s “expansive definition of antitrust liability” requires the government only to prove that a transaction’s effect “may be substantially to lessen competition.” According to Kanter, antitrust agencies have, for too long, “underenforced a statute that was meant to be prophylactic” by focusing on concrete evidence of a merger’s effect on prices.

On September 16, 2022, Kanter said that antitrust enforcers “can no longer be so cautious to avoid overenforcement that [they] intentionally underenforce the law.”

Moving away from negotiating settlements that allow transactions to proceed while resolving anticompetitive issues is part of a trend of dramatic policy and procedural changes at both the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) designed to discourage mergers and acquisitions (M&A), such as:

  • Suspending early termination of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) waiting period for transactions that do not raise competitive issues
  • Sending merging parties “close at your own risk” letters, informing the parties that antitrust investigations are ongoing despite expiration of the HSR waiting period
  • Insisting on inclusion of prior approval/prior notice provisions in all merger settlements
  • Including new topics, such as the impact on labor and environment, in Second Requests and adding additional hurdles to modifying Second Requests.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR MERGING PARTIES

Merging parties should increasingly consider resolving likely competitive issues with their transaction before the antitrust [...]

Continue Reading




FTC Continues To Zero In On Problematic M&A Noncompetes

Since September 2019, the Federal Trade Commission has challenged noncompete provisions in at least three transactions. These challenges demonstrate that the FTC will challenge noncompete provisions even when it concludes that the underlying transaction raises no substantive antitrust issues and when the provision relates to
minority investments.

Noncompete provisions help protect a buyer’s significant investment in an acquired business by restricting the seller from turning around and starting a new business that devalues the business sold. Although noncompete clauses often play a vital role in mergers and acquisitions, they are not immune from antitrust scrutiny. The recent challenges to noncompete provisions show that the FTC and other antitrust enforcers are closely scrutinizing noncompetes and will not hesitate to challenge problematic provisions — whether standalone or as part of a larger challenge to a transaction.

Parties to a commercial transaction, however, can easily manage these risks by carefully tailoring the scope of the noncompete to the transaction at hand. This article reviews recent enforcement actions involving noncompetes and provides practical guidance for mitigating antitrust risk associated with these valuable provisions.

Access Full Article




FTC Alleges Another Price Discrimination Market – Seeks to Block Wilhelmsen’s Acquisition of Drew Marine

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently announced that it has challenged a merger between Wilhelmsen Maritime Services (Wilhelmsen) and Drew Marine Group (Drew) because of an overlap in service to “global fleet customers,” a narrow customer segment that purchases marine water treatment chemicals and services.

WHAT HAPPENED:
  • The FTC issued an administrative complaint and filed a complaint in federal court seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, asserting that Wilhelmsen’s proposed $400 million acquisition of Drew would significantly reduce competition in the market for marine water treatment chemicals and services used by global fleets.
  • The FTC enforcement action focuses on a narrow sub-segment of customers, global fleet customers, that buys marine water treatment chemicals and services.
  • The FTC distinguished global fleet customers from other marine water treatment chemical customers on the basis that:
  • (1) global fleets have specialized needs that only a few suppliers can meet
    (turn-key global sales, service and delivery capabilities, as well as consistent and reliable product supply); and
  • (2) these customers seek out suppliers via requests for proposal and direct negotiation and therefore potential suppliers can price discriminate to that subset of customers.
  • Because of the specific needs of global fleet customers and because global fleet suppliers can identify which customers are seeking service for global fleets, suppliers are able to price discriminate to the global fleet customer set.
  • The FTC alleged a harm to competition because their investigation showed Wilhelmsen and Drew are each other’s closest competitors based on company documents, statements by the business personnel, and bid data showing that the companies are most frequently the first and second choice for global fleet customers. In addition, the FTC noted that Wilhelmsen and Drew would control at least 60 percent of the market with the next largest competitor having less than a 5 percent share.
  • The FTC complaint disparaged the remaining market participants as unable to practicably compete with Wilhelmsen and Drew to service global fleets because they are perceived as offering lower quality products with less reliability, having more limited service capabilities, and failing to price competitively.
WHAT THIS MEANS:
  • The FTC’s enforcement action continues a trend of applying price discrimination markets. These markets are characterized by: (1) buyers with special requirements that only select suppliers can service; and (2) sellers who can identify the buyers with those special requirements and selectively price based upon the knowledge of those special needs.
  • Antitrust enforcement of price discrimination markets lead to narrower product market definitions. Therefore, applying price discrimination markets may result in antitrust enforcers challenging mergers that appear lawful when viewed as a broader market.
  • There is increased risk of price discrimination markets being applied by antitrust enforcers in industries in which:
    • The customers’ end uses differ for the same product;
    • Merging companies’ documents recognize distinctions among customer groups; and
    • Groups of customers require unique product characteristics.



THE LATEST: Just Because Your Deal Cleared Doesn’t Mean You’re in the Clear

Dealmakers know that a critical part of the merger process is obtaining antitrust clearance from government enforcers. But, even if the antitrust enforcers review and clear a transaction, a third-party can file a private suit alleging the transaction violated the antitrust laws. Recently, an aggrieved customer did just that—it won a substantial jury verdict and is also seeking a court order to unwind the transaction nearly six years after the transaction was announced.

WHAT HAPPENED
  • On February 15, 2018, almost six years after Jeld-Wen announced an acquisition of Craftmaster Manufacturing, Inc. (CMI) in 2012, a federal jury awarded a customer, Steves and Sons (Steves), $58.6 million for antitrust damages and lost profits stemming from the acquisition. Additionally, Steves is seeking to unwind the 2012 Jeld-Wen/CMI transaction through a court order that would force Jeld-Wen to divest of assets sufficient to re-create a competitor as significant as CMI at the time of the acquisition in the doorskin market—that is, restoring competition to pre-transaction levels.
  • The Department of Justice (DOJ) reviewed, but did not challenge, Jeld-Wen’s acquisition of CMI, which reduced the number of doorskin suppliers from three to two. Interestingly, the 2012 transaction involved CMI, a company that entered the doorskin market in 2002, when it acquired divested assets because of DOJ concerns about a doorskin merger at that time.
  • One of the factors that led to DOJ clearance is that customers did not complain about the transaction. Prior to Jeld-Wen and CMI completing the transaction in 2012, Steves, entered into a long term supply agreement with Jeld-Wen.
  • After the transaction, Steves became dissatisfied with Jeld-Wen’s treatment and alleged that it received less favorable price terms, reduced product quality and output, and worse service.
  • As a result, in 2016—four years after closing—the customer filed a complaint alleging that Jeld-Wen’s acquisition of CMI violated the antitrust laws.
WHAT THIS MEANS
  • Business leaders must understand that even if antitrust enforcers clear a merger, not only can they revisit that decision, but third parties can also sue for damages or to unwind the transaction.
  • Steves did not complain about the merger until years after the transaction and yet still won a substantial verdict. This case is a reminder that business leaders must independently weigh the merits of their customer’s position (regardless of the antitrust enforcers’ posture regarding the same case) and manage the business appropriately after close to avoid a customer lawsuit.
  • Secondarily, business leaders must realize that customer lawsuits can also create significant operational issues that distract from the company’s business objectives. For example, not only may company personnel be distracted from running the business while assisting with the defense of the litigation, the company may also face significant legal costs, as well as invasive discovery. Further, a complaint filed by one private litigant could spur follow-on litigation from other aggrieved customers or third parties. Buyers should be cognizant of those risks and should consider whether mollifying any [...]

    Continue Reading



BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES

Ranked In Chambers USA 2022
US Leading Firm 2022