Patent Infringement
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THE LATEST: Non-Infringement of a Patent Also Not an Antitrust Injury

WHAT HAPPENED:
  • Wading into the merging streams of antitrust and patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld dismissal of an antitrust suit where a jury verdict in a parallel case found no patent infringement. Cascades Computer Innovation, LLC v. RPX Corp. and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Case No. 16-15782 (9th Cir., December 11, 2017).
  • Cascades Computer Innovation is a non-practicing entity that owns a series of 38 patents (collectively known as the Elbrus portfolio) allegedly used to optimize Android devices. Cascades intended to license these patents for use by companies including Motorola, HTC, Samsung, LG Electronics, Dell and RPX (a defensive patent aggregator that purchases patents on behalf of subscriber organizations using membership fees). An agreement couldn’t be reached. Cascades alleged this lack of agreement was due to a conspiracy between the defendants, using RPX, to not seek licenses for use of these patents—an agreement in violation of antitrust law.
  • Cascades filed two related lawsuits against Samsung, Motorola, HTC and others in separate district courts with separate causes of action. In Illinois, Cascades’ claim rested on patent infringement. Although the entire Elbrus portfolio was referenced in the complaint, the court determined only one patent, referred to by the court as “the ‘750 patent,” was truly at issue. Cascades asserted that merely installing the Android mobile device operating system resulted in an infringement of this patent. In California, Cascades relied on antitrust law arguing the agreement between defendants not to purchase licenses amounted to a violation. Again, the ‘750 patent was primarily at issue. Thus, Cascades simultaneously argued that a group of companies infringed on their patent and also that those companies illegally conspired to refuse to obtain licenses for use of that patent.
  • A jury in Illinois determined there was no patent infringement, which undercut Cascades’ argument in California. Without any infringement, the court in California noted “[o]nly those who possess antitrust standing by virtue of having suffered antitrust injury may bring a private action for damages for violation of the antitrust laws” before ruling for the defendants on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The California court reasoned that in order to show antitrust injury, there must be harm to competition, not any particular competitor. The court reasoned that a “failure to license a non-infringed patent typically cannot serve as the basis for a cognizable antitrust injury.” Because Cascades’ entire theory of injury was based upon ongoing infringement of the ‘750 patent, and not on any potential, unalleged future infringement, there was no antitrust injury in the case.
  • On appeal, the 9th Circuit determined the district court “properly recognized the preclusive effect of [the Illinois decision] and correctly reasoned that because the defendants did not infringe the ‘750 patent, Cascades’ failure to license the patent was not a cognizable antitrust injury.” In a footnote, the panel explained, “[h]ere, the defendants were not infringing the valid patent; therefore, they were not using the invention. Thus, the failure to license had no effect [...]

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Contractual Duty to Deal Does Not Equal Antitrust Duty to Deal

Addressing for the first time whether a patent holder under a contractual duty to deal is also subject to an antitrust duty to deal, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld dismissal of a putative antitrust class action challenge to a drug manufacturer’s refusal to fully supply competitors’ requested quantities under patent settlement agreements.  In re Adderall XR® Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-1232 (2d Cir., June 9, 2014) (Sack, J.).

The defendants, Shire, hold patents covering Adderall XR.  Previously, Shire sued generic drug manufacturers Teva and Impax for patent infringement after those manufacturers—seeking U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval to produce generic Adderall XR—argued that Shire’s patents were “invalid or will not be infringed.”  Shire settled with Teva and Impax in 2006 with variants of the traditional reverse-payment agreement.  In these settlement agreements, Teva and Impax agreed to stay out of the Adderall XR market for three years (even if FDA approval came earlier), but unlike a traditional reverse-payment agreement (where the patent holder pays money to the potential entrant), Shire agreed to grant licenses starting in 2009 for making and selling the drug and, if FDA approval had not yet occurred, to supply Teva and Impax’s requirements of unbranded Adderall XR for resale.  The 2d Circuit summarized the arrangement as follows: “Shire undertook to give its competitors both the rights and the supplies necessary to participate in the market for [Adderall XR].”  By the time Shire’s contractual exclusivity expired, the FDA had not approved either Teva or Impax’s applications, so Teva and Impax began purchasing from Shire.  Shortly thereafter, both companies alleged that Shire breached the settlement agreement obligations by refusing to fully fulfil their requirement orders.  However, both companies eventually settled with Shire.

In the present case, drug wholesaler and plaintiff Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company (LWD) brought a putative class action against Shire.  It alleged antitrust violations stemming from the effect of the supply shortfall on the prices the proposed class of drug wholesalers paid.  LWD argued that Shire’s “ordinary breach of contract” became “an unlawful act of monopolization” because, by entering into the agreements, Shire “relinquish[ed] its monopoly control over” Adderall XR vis-à-vis Teva and Impax and thereby created a “duty to deal” with its competitors under the Supreme Court’s 1985 Aspen Skiing decision.  Specifically, LWD alleged that Shire artificially inflated prices by holding back some of its supply from generic manufacturers/patent licensees Teva and Impax, from whom LWD purchased Adderall XR.  After the district court dismissed the complaint on a R. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, LWD appealed.

The 2d Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, concluding that LWD’s “allegations amount to the self-defeating claim that Shire monopolized the market by ceding its monopoly” and that “the complaint does little more than attach antitrust ‘labels and conclusions’ to what is, at most, an ordinary contract dispute to which the plaintiffs are not even parties.”  The court reasoned that “‘the sole exception to the broad right of [...]

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Patent Enforcement Protected by First Amendment?

After receiving a draft complaint and a stipulated order from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) banning its allegedly deceptive letters to infringers of its scanning technology, MPHJ Technology Investments LLC (MPHJ) filed suit against the FTC in the Western District of Texas, alleging violations of the First Amendment.  The complaint alleged that the FTC’s investigation prevented MPHJ from its government-granted right to enforce its patent, a form of free speech under the Bill of Rights.  On March 28, 2014, the FTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and MPHJ filed its response on April 18, 2014.

The FTC argued in its motion to dismiss that the controversy was not ripe for suit because there had been no final agency action, that MPHJ was not immune from suit because patent enforcement activity is not protected by the First Amendment and that the FTC is not looking to prevent MPHJ from sending letters, only looking to prevent the deceptive statements within those letters.

MPHJ contended in its response that the FTC’s draft complaint was a sufficient “credible threat” of suit to make the case ripe for adjudication.  MPHJ’s patent enforcement conduct included a threat to sue the alleged infringers, and it was this conduct, in part, that was subject to the FTC investigation and also protected by the First Amendment.  MPHJ argued that in order to sue it under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC must overcome the First Amendment protection for plaintiffs in a lawsuit from allegations of misconduct related to bringing that suit, which applies unless the suit brought was “objectively baseless.”  MPHJ argued that the FTC has not overcome the burden of showing objective baselessness, because in its investigation of MPHJ’s conduct, it concluded only that the letters threatening to sue infringers were “deceptive.”  According to MPHJ, allowing the type of enforcement activity pursued by the FTC would prevent patent holders like MPHJ from threatening to sue infringers.  MPHJ further argued that the District of Nebraska entered a preliminary injunction against the attorney general when faced with identical facts.

The case is MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC v. FTC, case number 6:14-cv-00011, pending before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.




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“Reverse Payment” Settlements Subject to Greater Antitrust Scrutiny: Implications of Supreme Court FTC v. Actavis Ruling

by Jeffrey W. Brennan

By rejecting the “scope of the patent” test and holding that reverse payment patent settlements “can sometimes violate the antitrust laws,” the Supreme Court of the United States subjects such settlements to greater antitrust scrutiny.  But, by establishing the rule of reason as the operative standard for adjudicating the cases, with the burden of proof on the plaintiff, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Trade Commission’s position that reverse payment settlements are “presumptively anticompetitive” and that the burden should be on defendants to overcome the presumption at trial.  Companies considering reverse payment settlements should evaluate a number of practical factors that may determine their level of antitrust risk.

Read the full article here.




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