Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter
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Antitrust M&A Snapshot | Q2 2024

Topics covered in this edition:

UNITED STATES

  • US agencies are increasingly scrutinizing consummated mergers from years past, including Live Nation’s purchase of Ticketmaster and Meta’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp.
  • Reports indicate that, over the past three years, companies have abandoned 37 deals in the face of Federal Trade Commission pressure.
  • Merger activity in oil and gas markets remains high, and although agencies are scrutinizing these deals, they engaged in minimal enforcement activity this quarter.

EUROPEAN UNION

  • Court of Justice of the European Union Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou issued his opinion in the Illumina/Grail case, concluding that Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation is not the European solution for dealing with “killer acquisitions.”
  • The European Commission (EC) issued a competition policy brief on non-price competition in EU merger control, noting that it is increasingly evaluating non-price competition parameters alongside traditional price effects for its merger reviews.
  • The EC suspects Kingspan to have intentionally, or negligently, provided incorrect, incomplete and misleading information while it investigated the company’s planned acquisition of Trimo in 2021.

UNITED KINGDOM

  • The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act will grant the Competition & Markets Authority with powers to enforce the new digital markets competition regime and will apply to firms that are designated as having strategic market status.

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DOJ’s Labor Market Prosecution Against Aerospace Employees Dismissed; Alleged Market Allocation Not Within Per Se Rule

On April 28, 2023, a judge from the US District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed the criminal non-solicitation case brought by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) against six employees of the aerospace industry. The case, known as U.S. v. Patel, et al., ended with the acquittal of all defendants.

The court’s decision was significant as it stated that the case did not “involve a market allocation under the per se rule” as a matter of law. The trial court based its decision on several arguments, themes and rulings made by the defense in the 2022 U.S. v. DaVita, Inc. and Kent Thiry criminal non-solicitation trial. In that trial, McDermott, who represented DaVita’s former CEO, secured an acquittal on all counts.

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Antitrust M&A Snapshot | Q3 2022

In the United States, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) lost four merger challenges (Illumina/GRAIL, UnitedHealth/Change Healthcare, U.S. Sugar/Imperial Sugar and Booz Allen/EverWatch) in September. The losses demonstrate that parties willing to litigate can have success in court. The absence of “smoking gun” documents and lack of a presumption of anticompetitive effects (based on market shares and concentration) made these cases very difficult for the government. The judges in these cases tended to credit structural and behavioral remedies that the government felt were insufficient and were persuaded by real-world testimony from executives and third parties contradicting the government’s theories of changed economic incentives from the transactions.

In July 2022, the European Parliament published the final text of the European Union’s upcoming instrument to address distortive foreign subsidies, following a provisional political agreement reached between the EU lawmakers in June (Foreign Subsidies Regulation). The Foreign Subsidies Regulation introduces a new mandatory screening mechanism including notification obligations and the European Commission’s right of ex officio investigations, which will have a considerable impact on M&A transactions and procurement procedures.

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation will enter into force once it is formally adopted by EU lawmakers and published in the Official Journal. It will become directly applicable across the European Union six months after entry into force. The notification obligations will start to apply nine months after entry into force. The Commission also is currently drafting procedural rules on how to notify transactions, how to calculate time limits, and the process for preliminary reviews and in-depth probes when there is a suspicion of distortive foreign subsidies.

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Seven Corporate Directors Resign: DOJ Ramps Enforcement Against Board Members Serving on Competitors’ Boards

WHAT HAPPENED

  • Seven directors resigned from corporate boards following promises of enforcement of Clayton Act Section 8 (15 U.S.C. § 19) by the US Department of Justice (DOJ), Antitrust Division (the Division), the Division announced Wednesday.
  • The directors served on the boards of corporations that the DOJ asserted competed in a variety of sectors, including information technology, software, and manufacturing.

WHAT’S THE LEGAL CONCERN

  • Section 8 prohibits “interlocking directorates” (per se violation), which occur when the same individual serves simultaneously as an officer or director of two competing companies (direct interlocks) or when different individuals on boards of competing companies act on behalf of and at the direction of a single firm (indirect interlocks through deputization). In its press release, the DOJ noted that some of the interlocks arose because a private equity firm appointed different personnel to the boards of competing companies.
  • The goal of Section 8 and the DOJ action is to decrease potential opportunities for the exchange of sensitive information between competitors and the risk of anticompetitive conduct more generally.
  • Exemptions might apply. There are de minimis exemptions if a) the competing sales are less than $4.1 million (threshold updated annually); b) the competing sales of either corporation represent less than 2% of its total sales; or c) the competing sales of each corporation are less than 4% of its total sales. A careful analysis (similar to that done in merger analysis) is necessary to determine whether an exemption might apply.
  • Not just corporations? While the plain language of Section 8 refers to interlocks involving “corporations,” the DOJ has stated its view that Section 8 also covers interlocks between non-corporate entities, such as LLCs (this is an open area of law).
  • Not just the same person? While the plain language of Section 8 states that it applies when the same “person” sits on the board or acts as an officer of two competitors, the DOJ interprets Section 8 broadly to mean that two different individuals appointed by a common entity cannot serve on boards of competitors because the entity is a “person” and is serving on the boards through its designees.

WHAT ARE THE RISKS

  • Interlocks can create significant antitrust risk. While the DOJ’s concerns with interlocks seem to be assuaged with the quick removal of the Corporate Director identified, interlocks have served as the factual underpinning for antitrust conspiracy claims. Therefore, companies should be proactive in eliminating problematic interlocks, as the interlock combined with parallel action by competitors in an industry could serve as the factual basis for long and costly conspiracy investigations or litigation and could support complaint allegations to defeat a Twombly-based motion to dismiss.

ANTICIPATE CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT

  • While the resignations are not novel, they represent a major amplification of corporate responses to what Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter has described as “an extensive review of interlocking directorates across the entire economy” and [...]

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Recent Treasury Department Report Emphasizes Fostering Competition in Labor Markets

Continuing the recent string of actions across the Biden administration in response to the July 2021 Executive Order on “Promoting Competition in the American Economy,” on March 7, 2022, the US Treasury Department (Treasury) released a report titled “The State of Labor Market Competition,” and on March 10, 2022, the US Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Labor (DOL) announced a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to strengthen and coordinate enforcement efforts in labor markets. These developments highlight the administration’s continuing focus on anticompetitive conduct in the labor markets at both the local and national levels and warrant careful attention by employers of all sizes and in all industries.

Treasury Report In Depth

  • Treasury’s report sets out to “summarize the prevalence and impact of uncompetitive firm behavior in labor markets.”
  • It focuses on both inter-employer conduct—such as the sharing of wage information, entering into no-poach agreements and outright conspiracies to fix wages—and employer-employee conduct—like forcing workers to sign non-compete agreements, mandatory arbitration agreements and class action waivers, misclassification of employees as independent contractors and opacity surrounding employees’ compensation rates—as being potentially anticompetitive and contributing to the imbalance of power between employers and employees in labor markets.
  • The structures of various labor markets, including overall low rates of unionization, “fissuring” of workplaces as a wide variety of job functions (e.g., janitorial or food services) are outsourced from in-house employees to external contractors, and occupational licensing requirements imposed by federal, state, and/or local governments, are highlighted as having overall negative effects on the competitiveness of various labor markets.
  • The report estimates that employers’ market power is responsible for approximately 20% lower wages compared to a fully competitive labor market, and notes that the harms that flow from a lack of labor market competition disproportionately impact lower-income occupations, women and people of color.
  • The report concludes by emphasizing that adverse effects on workers as a result of limited competition in labor markets have broader effects on the labor markets, the firms that participate in them and the economy as a whole.
  • Finally, the report specifically examines the labor markets in the healthcare, agricultural and minor-league baseball industries, and it outlines the Biden administration’s efforts to increase competition and deter and punish anticompetitive conduct in labor markets across the country.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

  • The DOJ and DOL’s MOU likewise emphasizes the shared “interest in protecting workers who have been harmed or may be at risk of being harmed as a result of anticompetitive conduct,” as Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter noted in the joint press release announcing the MOU, “[p]rotecting the right of workers to earn a fair wage is core to the work of both our agencies, and it will continue to receive extraordinary vigilance from the Antitrust Division.”
  • The MOU states the DOJ’s and DOL’s intent to “share enforcement information, collaborate on new policies, and ensure that workers are protected from collusion and unlawful employer behavior.”
  • [...]

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DOJ Antitrust Division Signals Impending Criminal Monopolization Cases

WHAT HAPPENED

On March 2, 2022, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard Powers revealed that the DOJ intends to investigate and pursue alleged criminal violations against individuals or companies who violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. For more than 40 years, criminal enforcement of antitrust laws have focused nearly exclusively on hardcore, per se anticompetitive agreements (i.e., price fixing, output restriction or market allocation) among two or more horizontal competitors. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, on the other hand, primarily focuses on conduct by one firm or company with significant market power and, typically, is a means to bring a civil case for monopolization or anticompetitive use of the existing monopoly power.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

This marks a radical departure from longstanding DOJ antitrust enforcement of monopolization claims. In general, the DOJ has refrained from Section 2 criminal prosecutions.

Section 2 makes it illegal to acquire or maintain monopoly power through anticompetitive means and focuses primarily on unilateral or one-sided anticompetitive behavior. Courts (including the Supreme Court of the United States) generally have analyzed Section 2 cases under the “rule of reason,” which weighs both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of conduct.

Because the rule of reason imposes a balancing test that is akin to the preponderance of evidence standard, the higher criminal burden of proof could clash with existing jurisprudence and agency guidelines on Section 2 enforcement standards. In contrast, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive agreements—where courts have automatically deemed certain types of agreements, such as agreements to fix prices, allocate markets or rig bids—as illegal “per se,” because they (through ample judicial and economic experience) have been deemed to produce little or no procompetitive effects.

DOJ’s HISTORY WITH SECTION 2

In the last 50 years, the vast majority of criminal cases that the Antitrust Division has brought involved per se illegal agreements under Section 1. The Antitrust Division appears to have initiated very few criminal Section 2 cases during that same period with mixed success. For instance, in United States v. Cuisinarts, the DOJ prosecuted the defendant under Section 2 for per se resale price maintenance agreements.[1] The defendant agreed to pay a $250,000 fine for a plea of nolo contendere. However, today, the per se criminal treatment of resale price maintenance is in serious doubt as the long line of Supreme Court decisions from GTE Sylvania to Leegin have firmly placed most vertical resale price restraints for Section 2 under the rule of reason standard.

WHAT’S NEXT

In 2016, the Federal Trade Commission and the DOJ released a joint publication called the “Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals” when announcing expanded criminal enforcement in labor markets for wage fixing and no-poaching agreements.[2] We expect the DOJ to release similar guidance with respect to criminal prosecution of Section 2 claims.

The policy shift raises a host of additional questions, such as what types of conduct under Section 2 the Division intends to focus [...]

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