2018 saw a significant upswing in antitrust litigation against health care providers; 27 cases were filed in 2018 versus 17 in 2017. In the latest Antitrust Update for Health Care Providers, we discuss what caused the notable rise, what kinds of cases were brought over the past two years and how they were decided, and what cases warrant particular attention in 2019.
The first quarter of 2019 proved to be as active as ever for antitrust regulators in both the United States and Europe. In the United States, vertical merger enforcement was the focus of a few high-profile matters. The US DOJ has been working on an update to the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, possibly providing clarification for merging parties.
Meanwhile in Europe, although the European Commission cleared a number of merger control proceedings with remedies, the European Commission also blocked two transactions during the first quarter of 2019.
The Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest in three related cases in the Eastern District of Washington yesterday dealing with alleged “no-poach” (or non-solicitation) agreements between franchisors like Carl’s Jr, Auntie Anne’s and Arby’s and their franchisees.
In the statement, the DOJ distinguished between “naked” no-poach agreements between competitors and the kinds of no-poach agreements in the franchise context that are typically vertical restraints between the parent company and the individual franchisee.
According to the DOJ, naked no-poach agreements should be analyzed as per se, or presumptively anticompetitive and illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, while most vertical restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason which requires some balancing of potential harms and benefits.
The statement did, however, distinguish two scenarios where franchise agreements could still merit per se
In a situation where the “franchisees operating under the same brand name agreed amongst themselves (and wholly independent from the franchisor), for example, not to hire any person ever previously employed by another franchisee that is a party to the agreement.” Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc. et al., No. 2:18-cv-00244-SAB, Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 11 (Mar. 7, 2019).
In an agreement between a franchisor and franchisee relating to competition in a market where they actually compete. “If operating in the same geographic market, they both could look to the same labor pool to hire, for example, janitorial workers, accountants or human resource professionals. In such circumstances, the franchisor is competing with its franchisee.” If such agreement is not ancillary to any legitimate and procompetitive joint venture, it would warrant per seId. at 13.
WHAT THIS MEANS:
For many franchises, the DOJ’s distinction between “naked” and vertical no-poach agreements will represent welcome respite from the onslaught of class actions that have been filed recently.
Franchisors and franchisees, however, will still need to demonstrate any past or future no poach agreements are not (1) between franchisees and independent of the franchisor, or (2) operating in the same geographic market where both entities actually compete.
It also remains to be seen whether the court will adopt the DOJ’s view on the topic, and how State Attorneys General will react.
Antitrust regulators in the United States and Europe were very active in the final quarter of 2018 closing a large number of cases requiring in-depth investigations. In the United States, regulators continue their focus on the potential need to update their methods of reviewing high-tech transactions with public hearings on the future of antitrust enforcement.
In Europe, recent reviews of Takeda’s acquisition of Shire and the creation of a joint venture between Daimler and BMW show a focus on how transactions will impact innovation for new products.
Although 2018 saw guilty pleas and new indictments in several ongoing Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations, the year finished by continuing a downward trend in antitrust enforcement. DOJ’s criminal and civil fines in 2018 ended around $400 million—well short of the billion-dollar plus highs in 2014 and 2015, during the height of the auto parts and foreign exchange investigations. EU fines ended at €800 million, which was less than in 2017 and less than one fourth of the amount of fines imposed in 2016.
US DEVELOPMENTS
The DOJ has intervened in three federal class actions in the Eastern District of Washington to express its view over the proper standard of scrutiny to apply to no-poach agreements that are at the heart of several civil suits across the country. While a longer, more formal statement from the DOJ is expected soon, it appears that the DOJ will argue that the rule of reason should apply to most if not all of these lawsuits.
The DOJ revealed a new investigation into the bid rigging of fuel-supply contracts for US armed forces abroad. Three South Korea-based companies agreed to plead guilty to criminal charges and to pay $82 million in criminal fines for their involvement in a decade-long bid-rigging conspiracy that targeted contracts to supply fuel to United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force bases in South Korea.
Two former Deutsche Bank traders urged a Manhattan federal judge in December 2018 to reverse their convictions for rigging the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and to dismiss the charges against them. Prosecutors obtained the convictions in October 2018 by arguing that the two traders had conspired with the bank’s Libor submitters to skew the lending benchmark to benefit their derivative trades. In December, the pair argued that prosecutors obtained that conviction by lying to the court and the jury and by hiding evidence from defense attorneys throughout the case.
Two executives pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the DOJ’s investigation into price fixing in the freight-forwarding industry.
While the DOJ’s investigation into price fixing of online promotional products appeared to slow, in November 2018, the DOJ announced new charges against another online promotional products company and its executive for conspiring to fix prices for customized promotional products, including wristbands, lanyards, temporary tattoos and buttons between May 2014 and June 2016.
The DOJ’s investigation into bid rigging of public real estate foreclosure auctions continues, as additional charges and guilty pleas continue to roll in.
Following up on an indictment from 2015, the DOJ obtained a plea agreement from an art dealer in the UK for agreeing with its competitors on Amazon Marketplace and elsewhere to fix the price of art posters sold online to customers in the US. The defendant agreed to pay a criminal fine of $50,000, plus fees, and agreed to a recommended sentence between 12 and 60 months.
EU DEVELOPMENTS
In November 2018, the Commission opened an investigation to determine [...]
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) recently sued former joint venture partners because they allegedly coordinated their competitive activities beyond the legitimate scope of their venture. This case illustrates several important points. First, companies who collaborate through joint ventures and similar arrangements need to be mindful that any legitimate collaborative activity does not “spill over” to restrain competition in other unrelated areas. Second, DOJ discovered the conduct during its review of documents produced in connection with a merger investigation. This is the most recent reminder of how broad ranging discovery in merger investigations can result in wholly unrelated conduct investigations and lawsuits. Third, one of the parties was a portfolio company of a private equity sponsor, highlighting how private investors can be targeted for antitrust violations. (more…)
As highlighted in a recent lawsuit, aerospace and defense contractors can face various antitrust risks when using certain tactics to prevent other companies from hiring their employees. See Hunter v. Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corp., No. 2:19-CV-411 (S.D. Ohio). The plaintiff, a former intelligence professional who worked at the US government’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe Analytic Center in Molesworth, England (JAC Molesworth), filed an antitrust suit on behalf of herself and a class of JAC Molesworth employees. She alleges that three military intelligence contractors—Booz Allen, CACI and Mission Essential—entered into illegal agreements not to hire one another’s employees. The complaint alleges that the three contractors each had Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts and, prior to the alleged “no-poach” agreement, competed aggressively to hire employees with experience at JAC Molesworth to provide services under contract task orders. According to the complaint, these alleged no-poach agreements had the effect of suppressing the wages and benefits for skilled workers at JAC Molesworth because they stopped a bidding war for talent.
The US Federal Trade Commission recently announced increased thresholds for the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 and for determining whether parties trigger the prohibition against interlocking directors under Section 8 of the Clayton Act.
Notification Threshold Adjustments
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced revised thresholds for the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR) pre-merger notifications on February 15, 2019. These increased thresholds will become effective mid-to-late March. These new thresholds apply to any transaction that closes on or after the effective date.
The base filing threshold, which frequently determines whether a transaction requires filing of an HSR notification, will increase to $90 million.
The alternative statutory size-of-transaction test, which captures all transactions valued above a certain size (even if the “size-of-person” threshold is not met), will be adjusted to $359.9 million.
The statutory size-of-person thresholds will increase slightly to $18 million and $180 million.
The adjustments will affect parties contemplating HSR notifications in various ways. Transactions that meet the current “size-of-transaction” threshold, but will not meet the adjusted $90 million threshold, will only need to be filed if they will close before the new thresholds take effect mid-to-late March.
Parties may also realize a benefit of lower notification filing fees for certain transactions. Under the rules, the acquiring person must pay a filing fee, although the parties may allocate that fee amongst themselves. Filing fees for HSR-reportable transactions will remain unchanged; however, the size of transactions subject to the filing fee tiers will shift upward as a result of the gross national product (GNP)-indexing adjustments:
Filing FeeSize-of-Transaction $45,000 $90 million, but less than $180 million $125,000 $180 million, but less than $899.8 million $280,000 $899.8 million or more Interlocking Directorate Thresholds Adjustment
The FTC also announced revised thresholds for interlocking directorates. The FTC revises these thresholds annually based on the change in the level of GNP. Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits a person from serving as a director or officer of two competing corporations if certain thresholds are met. Pursuant to the recently revised thresholds, Section 8 of the Clayton Act applies to corporations with more than $36,564,000 in capital, surplus and undivided profits, but it does not apply where either interlocked corporation has less than $3,656,400 in competitive sales. These new thresholds are effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register, expected within the week.
On January 28, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that it had accepted a proposed settlement with office supply distributors Staples and Essendant in connection with Staples’ proposed $482.7 million acquisition of Essendant. The settlement suggests that the FTC is currently more willing than the US Department of Justice (DOJ) to accept conduct remedies to resolve competitive issues raised by vertical mergers.
WHAT HAPPENED:
The FTC Commissioners voted 3-2 to accept a proposed settlement establishing a firewall to prevent Staples from receiving competitively sensitive customer information from Essendant.
Staples is the largest reseller of office products in the US, and one of only two retail office supply superstores in the US. Essendant is one of only two nationwide office product wholesale distributors. In September 2018, Staples agreed to acquire Essendant.
Staples competes with various resellers to sell office supplies to mid-sized companies. Many of those resellers rely on Essendant as their wholesale distributor. In that role, resellers have to provide Essendant with detailed information about their end customers’ identities, purchasing history, product preferences and similar data.
The FTC alleged in its complaint that the transaction was likely to harm competition by giving Staples access to the commercially sensitive information (CSI) of Essendant’s resellers and those resellers’ end customers. The FTC contended that access to that information could allow Staples to offer higher prices than it otherwise would when bidding against a reseller for an end customer’s business.
To address this competitive concern, the FTC imposed a conduct remedy. Specifically, the FTC required the parties to establish a firewall limiting Staples’ access to the CSI of Essendant’s resellers and the end customers of those resellers.
Two FTC Commissioners issued dissenting statements, arguing that the settlement does not fully remedy the transaction’s likely anticompetitive effects. In the dissenters’ view, the evidence suggests that the integrated firm could implement a strategy of raising costs for Staples’ reseller rivals.
WHAT THIS MEANS:
The settlement indicates that the FTC remains willing to cure competitive issues raised by vertical mergers with conduct remedies, such as firewalls, instead of imposing a divestiture or seeking to block the deal.
Under Makan Delrahim’s leadership, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division has been less receptive of conduct remedies, even in vertical merger cases. Delrahim has stated that conduct remedies are fundamentally regulatory and are inconsistent with the DOJ’s role as a law enforcement agency.
The DOJ refused to accept conduct remedies to resolve the competitive issues arising from AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner. DOJ challenged the transaction in federal court. In June 2018, a DC district court judge ruled against the DOJ, and the case is currently on appeal to the DC Circuit.
One of the FTC Commissioners, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, argued in her dissenting statement that the FTC should be more willing to challenge, and seek to block vertical mergers when it identifies competitive concerns. That position is more aligned with the DOJ’s currently stated policy, but overall the FTC appears more willing to accept conduct remedies [...]
In a December 7 speech before the Berkeley-Stanford Advanced Patent Law Institute, the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim (AAG Delrahim) announced that the DOJ will withdraw its assent to the 2013 Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary FRAND Commitments (the Policy Statement) and elaborated upon the DOJ’s enforcement approach to standard setting organizations (SSOs).
WHAT HAPPENED:
AAG Delrahim voiced support for the right of patent holders to seek injunctions against misuses of their technologies. According to AAG Delrahim, the appropriate test for injunctive relief in patent cases is the one articulated by the US Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange. Under the eBay standard, to obtain an injunction, a patent holder must demonstrate that:
It has suffered an irreparable injury;
Remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
Considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
The public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
AAG Delrahim expressed concern that the Policy Statement, which in his view suggests that injunctions may not serve the public interest, may bias courts applying the eBay test against issuing injunctions. Because AAG Delrahim’s stance is that injunctions frequently do serve the public interest, he is worried that the Policy Statement will cause confusion. Based on this worry and AAG Delrahim’s disagreement with the Policy Statement’s position, the DOJ will withdraw its assent to the Policy Statement.
AAG Delrahim also elaborated upon his concerns with SSOs. He explained that an SSO can act anti-competitively in carrying out two tasks. First, an SSO can act anti-competitively while carrying out the standard setting process (g., by refusing to license a new and innovative technology by a maverick firm that the members of the SSO view as threatening). Second, an SSO can act anti-competitively in adopting and implementing patent policies (e.g., by adopting licensing terms that favor implementers over patent holders).
WHAT THIS MEANS:
Though the DOJ is withdrawing its assent to the Policy Statement, it will attempt to replace it with a new one. AAG Delrahim said that the DOJ will engage the Patent Office to initiate this process. The DOJ is likely to push for language more favorable to standard essential patent holders seeking injunctions.
The withdrawal of the Policy Statement may affect patent cases not only before federal district courts, but also before the International Trade Commission (ITC). The Policy Statement was designed to inform the ITC, as well as federal courts, on the appropriateness of issuing an exclusion order in patent cases.
Delrahim announced two policies the DOJ will adopt with respect to SSOs. First, the DOJ will investigate and bring enforcement actions against standard setting practices that are anticompetitive. Second, the DOJ will embrace a policy of encouraging competition between SSOs. As part of the policy, the DOJ may, for example, scrutinize competitors for [...]